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The Balance of Power in Early Acadia* 
EARLY IN THE SUMMER OF 1613, Samuel Argali and the English ship Treasurer 
arrived off the coast of New England in response to reports that a French expedition 
was trying to settle on land claimed by the Virginia Company. Cruising the waters 
off what is now central Maine, Argali and his crew searched in vain for signs of the 
interlopers until a local Indian pointed them in the right direction. Their target, the 
fledgling mission settlement of Saint Sauveur, opposite Mount Desert Island, was 
totally unprepared for the attack. Though the French had been at Saint Sauveur for 
several weeks, they had done nothing to defend the place, and though they had 
known for days that English ships were in the area they had taken no steps either to 
fight or to flee. When Argali attacked, most of the French were on shore, and those 
still on the ship had turned its sails into a canopy to protect themselves from the 
sun. "The English ship came on swifter than an arrow", wrote one of the French, 
"...[with] the banners of England flying, and three trumpets and two drums making 
a horrible din". It also came with cannons blazing and with 60 musketeers, and it 
quickly overwhelmed the French, i 
To the combatants at Saint Sauveur the context in which their battle occurred 
was obvious; it was part of an Anglo-French conflict that had started centuries 
before and might continue for centuries to come. And a similar ethnocentric bias 
has long marked histories of the event. To most scholars, Saint Sauveur was a 
"salvo of imperial conflict" in which Native Americans played only an incidental 
role. The French accepted, and most historians have repeated, the anguished 
confession of a Kennebec native that he mistook the English ship for a French one 
and directed it to Saint Sauveur.2 There is, however, an alternative scenario that 
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few historians have considered: that the Indian informant knew exactly what he 
was doing when he sent the English to Saint Sauveur and that he did so in the 
hope that Argali would expel the French and restore the area to Indian control. 
There is no direct evidence that proves this view, but it fits closely with ethno-
historians' view of Indian-White relations in the opening phase of European 
expansion. Whenever Europeans entered a new region of the Americas, they found 
that Indian numbers and knowledge of the local environment easily matched their 
own technological advantages at the time of contact, and this led to a temporary 
balance of power between the two groups that vanished once Europeans and their 
germs established themselves in greater numbers. 3 One of the most important 
elements of this distinctive early relationship was that Native American leaders 
sometimes found they could use the newcomers in advancing their own efforts to 
gain or maintain power in tribal and inter-tribal affairs. As Richard Metcalf wrote 
in 1974, "an examination of the lives of Indians who were prominent in the early 
phases of Indian-white relations...discloses that their central concern was not the 
white presence but the internal political context of their own communities, and that 
they were exploiting the white presence to promote personal and factional 
advantage within those communities".« More to the point of this paper, the idea of 
Indian agency at Saint Sauveur makes perfect sense if one understands the nature 
and extent of cultural contact in early Acadia and the Native American context in 
which Saint Sauveur was established and destroyed. 
In the first decade of the 17th century, Acadia was home to perhaps as many as 
30,000 Native Americans: Souriquois in what are now New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia and Etchemin between the Kennebec and Saint John Rivers in coastal 
Maine.5 Pre-contact Souriquois and Etchemin lived by hunting, fishing and 
1972), pp. 87-9 (quote from page 87); John G. Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal 
Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Toronto, 1981), pp. 11-20 and 58-79. 
3 For a recent discussion of this process in America and elsewhere, see Urs Bitterli, Cultures in 
Conflict: Encounters Between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492-1800, translated by 
Ritchie Robertson (Stanford, 1989). 
4 P. Richard Metcalf, "Who Should Rule at Home: Native-American Politics and Indian-White 
Relations", Journal of American History, 61 (1974), pp. 651-65, quote on p. 653. 
5 Scholars have long debated the identity and distribution of the Indians living in pre-contact Acadia, 
especially in the Kennebec-Penobscot region (for a summary of this debate, see Bruce J. Bourque, 
"Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759", Ethnohistory, 36 (1989), pp. 257-84 and Robert 
S. Grumet, Historic Contact: Indian Peoples and Colonists in Today's Northeastern United States 
in the Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries (Norman, Oklahoma, and London, 1995), pp. 71-7). 
My own inclination is to accept the argument of scholars such as Bourque that early European 
observers accurately recorded the indigenous peoples of Acadia. In this paper, therefore, I have 
employed the names reported by Samuel Champlain for the three major groups he encountered in 
northern New England and the Maritime Provinces of Canada: Souriquois east of the St. John 
River, Etchemin between the St. John and Kennebec Rivers and Armouchiquois south of the 
Kennebec. To distinguish among different bands within these groups, I use geographical 
descriptives, often the rivers near which they lived. This is quite similar to the terminology recently 
employed in Emerson W. Baker, Edwin A. Churchill, Richard D'Abate, Kristine L. Jones, Victor 
A. Konrad and Harold E.L. Prins, eds., American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and 
Cartography in the Land of Norumbega (Lincoln, Nebraska, and London, 1994). Population 
estimates are equally debatable; mine are based on those provided in Harald E.L. Prins, "Children 
of Gluskap: Wabanaki Indians on the Eve of the European Invasion", in Baker, et al., eds., 
American Beginnings, pp. 95-117. 
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gathering. Some of the western Etchemin may have grown small quantities of 
tobacco, but both groups took their food from the forests and waters around them. 
In the spring and summer men fished in rivers, lakes and coastal waters for 
salmon, shad, eels and shellfish or hunted marine mammals, while women 
gathered fruits, berries and ground nuts. During the fall and winter months they 
lived on the meat of large game — moose, bears and caribou — slowed by heavy 
snow or made do with smaller game and shellfish if the snows never came.6 
Both Souriquois and Etchemin lived in bands under the leadership of 
sagamores,7 and at the turn of the 16th century the most powerful sagamore in 
Acadia was probably Messamouet, a Souriquois from Cap de la Heve. 
Messamouet's power, while rooted in traditional Native culture, had been greatly 
enhanced by his early contact with Europeans. Cap de la Heve is on the Atlantic 
coast of Nova Scotia, and during the last quarter of the 16th century English, 
French and Basque fishermen landed there to dry their catches. Once ashore, crew 
members did more than split and salt cod. They also traded with the local 
population. The latter, in turn, quickly gained an appreciation for European goods 
and an awareness of the European passion for furs, and by the end of the century 
Souriquois were coasting as far south as Cape Cod in search of pelts to offer their 
European friends.s To secure those furs, Souriquois parties used both trade and war, 
and both approaches served to increase their power. As traders with a European 
connection, they gained prestige through their ability to supply items of ritual 
significance, such as glass beads, as well as practical marvels, such as metal 
hatchets and knives. As warriors they enjoyed the greater power that came with 
metal arrowheads and axes. And in either guise, they benefitted from the perception 
that access to new technology meant access to powerful new beings.9 
6 Frank G. Speck, Penobscot Man: The Life History of a Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia, 1940), 
p. 194; Peter A. Thomas, "Contrastive Subsistence Strategies and Land Use as factors for 
Understanding Indian-White Relations in New England", Ethnohistory, 23 (1976), pp. 1-18; Philip 
K. Bock, "Micmac", in Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Northeast, which is vol. 15 in William C. 
Sturtevant, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, 9 vols, to date (Washington, D.C., 1978-), 
pp. 110-12; Dean R. Snow, The Archaeology of New England (New York, 1980), p. 56; Prins, 
"Children of Gluskap", pp. 102-5. 
7 Sagamores, or sachems, were usually chosen by consensus among their people, on the basis of 
charisma, experience and lineage. They governed through their followers' consent rather than any 
ability to impose their own will upon them. Nicholas N. Smith, "The Changing Role of the 
Wabanaki Chief and Shaman", in William Cowan, ed., Actes du Huitième Congres Algonquinistes 
(Ottawa, 1977), pp. 213-21; Dean R. Snow, "The Ethnohistoric Baseline of the Eastern Abenaki", 
Ethnohistory, 23 (1976), pp. 291-306; Prins, "Children of Gluskap", pp. 99-100. 
8 Bruce J. Bourque and Ruth Holmes Whitehead, "Tarrentines and the Introduction of European 
Trade Goods in the Gulf of Maine", Ethnohistory, 32 (1985), pp. 327-41; James Axtell, "At the 
Water's Edge: Trading in the Sixteenth Century", in his After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory 
of Colonial North America (Oxford, 1988), pp. 144-81; James Axtell, "Through Another Glass 
Darkly: Early Indian Views of Europeans", ibid., pp. 125-43. 
9 Bourque and Whitehead, "Tarrentines"; Calvin Martin, "The Four Lives of a Micmac Copper Pot", 
Ethnohistory, 22 (1975), pp. 111-33; Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic 
Age"Reconsidered (Kingston and Montreal, 1985), p. 137; idem, "Early Native North American 
Responses to European Contact: Romantic versus Rationalistic Interpretations", Journal of 
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It remains unclear whether Souriquois actions ignited new conflicts in the 
Acadian population or simply exacerbated old ones. According to Bruce Trigger, 
"as the fur trade became more important, Indian groups in the Maritimes seem to 
have begun to fight with adjacent bands in order to secure larger hunting 
territories", and if that was the case, Messamouet may have made new enemies in 
his own tribe and among other tribes through his aggressive campaign to acquire 
pelts. Colin Calloway, however, has recently claimed that pre-contact Etchemin 
"repelled occasional Micmac [Souriquois] forays from the northeast", suggesting 
that Messamouet simply widened pre-existing divisions within the Indian 
community. What is clear is that by 1604 some Etchemin and some Souriquois 
definitely considered one another enemies and that access to European trade goods 
was one of the issues dividing them in what many scholars call the Tarrentine 
W a r . 10 
It is also clear that relations between them grew more complicated as Europeans 
sought to establish permanent settlements in the region. Between 1604 and 1608 
both France and England tried to colonize Acadia, and every new settlement offered 
the Indians near it a way around Messamouet's monopoly on European products 
and perhaps an opportunity to replace him as the principal supplier of those 
products. 
France provided the first opening to Messamouet's rivals. In the summer of 1604 
Pierre du Gast, Sieur de Monts, arrived on the St. Croix River, in what is now 
Maine, to establish a French base from which to conduct trade and missionary 
activity. The St. Croix was Etchemin territory, and the Natives there were probably 
too weak to challenge Messamouet. From the St. Croix, however, de Monts' 
navigator and geographer, Samuel de Champlain, explored the largely unknown 
coast to the sduTfi and opened relations with larger, more powerful, Etchemin 
bands. Champlain spent several days meeting and trading with Indians fishing in 
Penobscot Bay and then sailed up the Penobscot River to meet "Bessabez". 
Bashabes, as the name is usually rendered, was the most powerful Etchemin 
sagamore of the early 17th century and was probably the most powerful sagamore 
in Acadia after Messamouet. From the village of Upsegon, near the modern city of 
Bangor, Maine, he presided over a confederacy that included six other villages of 
the Penobscot Etchemin and some of those belonging to the Kennebec band — 
perhaps a third of the tribe's total population.n 
Until Champlain arrived, Bashabes had no regular contact with Europeans and 
could only acquire European products through middlemen such as Messamouet, 
whose Souriquois Bashabes identified as "enemies" to Champlain. The Etchemin 
sagamore, therefore, was no doubt delighted by the opportunity for direct trade that 
American History, 11 (1991), pp. 1195-215; Christopher L. Miller and George R. Hamell, "A New 
Perspective on Indian-White Contact: Cultural Symbols and Colonial Trade", Journal of American 
History, 73 (1986), pp. 311-28; David V. Burley, "Proto-Historic Ecological Effects of the Fur 
Trade on Micmac Culture in Northeastern New Brunswick", Ethnohistory, 28 (1981), pp. 203-16. 
10 Trigger, Natives and Newcomers, pp. 137-8; Colin G. Calloway, Dawnland Encounters: Indians 
and Europeans in Northern New England (Hanover, N.H., 1991), pp. 5-6; Snow, Archaeology of 
New England, pp. 26, 37; Bourque and Whitehead, "Tarrentines"; Samuel Champlain, Des 
Sauvages, ou, Voyage de Samuel Champlain, in H.P. Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel Champlain, 
6 vols. (Toronto, 1922; reprinted 1971), I: pp. 289-98. . 
11 Champlain, Voyages, 1: pp. 270-300; Snow, Archaeology of New England, p. 37. 
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Champlain presented. Speaking through interpreters from the St. Croix, the French 
told Bashabes that they hoped to be friends with the Etchemin and to reconcile 
them with their northern enemies. Moreover, said Champlain, the French "desired 
to settle in their country and show them how to cultivate it, in order that they 
might no longer lead so miserable an existence as they were doing". According to 
Champlain, Bashabes understood this and was pleased. The sagamore even 
declared, wrote the French explorer, "that no greater benefit could come to them 
than to have our friendship; and that they desired us to settle in their country, and 
wished to live in peace with their enemies, in order that in the future they might 
hunt the beaver more than they had ever done, and barter these beaver with us in 
exchange for things necessary for their usage". 12 
Champlain was only visiting though. He soon returned to St. Croix, and in the 
year that followed the French grew even closer to Bashabes' Souriquois enemies. 
The winter of 1604-05 proved so harsh at St. Croix that when spring came the 
survivors chose "to escape the cold and the dreadful winter" by moving across the 
Bay of Fundy to a more sheltered harbour where they established Port Royal. This 
move took the French back into Souriquois territory, though far from the la Heve 
region they already knew. 13 Around Port Royal the local sagamore was 
Membertou, an aggressive and ambitious leader. Champlain said he "had a 
reputation of being the worst and most treacherous man of his tribe", and Marc 
Lescarbot called him "a very great and cruel warrior". 14 On meeting the French, 
however, he was on his best behaviour. Like Bashabes, Membertou had previously 
enjoyed European goods only through Souriquois traders from la Heve, and like 
Bashabes he was apparently anxious to establish his own links with the French in 
order to increase his influence around the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine. 
Eventually, he would show a willingness to do so at the expense of any Natives in 
the region, including other Souriquois, but at first he deferred to Messamouet, who 
was serving then as one of de Monts' guides and translators, and cooperated with 
his fellow Souriquois against a common foe: Bashabes.15 
They began by strengthening or establishing alliances between the Souriquois 
and other Natives closer to Bashabes' Etchemin. Such an alliance may have 
existed already between the Souriquois and some of the eastern Etchemin bands as 
Messamouet seems to have known the St. Croix and St. John regions before he 
arrived there with de Monts in 1604. It was certainly established by September of 
1606, because in that month Messamouet and an Etchemin sagamore named 
Secodun travelled south from the St. John to the Saco River "to make an alliance 
with those of that country". These overtures were probably directed at the 
northernmost village of the Armouchiquois, and the logical object of any 
12 Champlain, Voyages, 1 : pp. 270-300. 
13 Champlain, Voyages, 1 : p. 367. 
14 Champlain, Voyages, 1: p. 384; Marc Lescarbot, History of New France, 3 vols., translated and 
edited by W.L. Grant and published as vols. 1, 7, and 11 in Publications of the Champlain Society 
(Toronto, 1907, 1911, and 1914), 2: p. 254. 
15 Champlain, Voyages, 1: p. 295; Lescarbot, History, 1: pp. 281 and 354-5. 
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cooperation between Souriquois and Armouchiquois were the Etchemin bands 
living between the Saco and St. John Rivers. If Messamouet could enlist southern 
aid he could attack Bashabes on two fronts;ie so to impress the Armouchiquois, he 
played the French card very heavily, bringing with him both a range of goods 
obtained from the French — including kettles, axes, knives and clothing — and a 
French ship. Champlain and the new French commander at Port Royal, Jean de 
Biencourt, Sieur de Poutrincourt, had encountered Messamouet outside the mouth 
of the St. Croix just as he and Secodun were preparing to leave for the Saco and 
had agreed to accompany the Indians on their diplomatic mission. 17 
Thus, in late September, Souriquois, Etchemin and French all came calling on 
the Armouchiquois. According to Champlain, Messamouet "began a harangue 
before the Indians, pointing out 'how of past time they had often had friendly 
intercourse together, and that they could easily overcome their enemies if they 
would come to terms, and make use of the friendship of the French, whom they saw 
there present exploring their country, in order to bring merchandise to them and to 
aid them with their resources'". When he finished, Messamouet presented to the 
Armouchiquois the French goods he had brought with him, suggestive, no doubt, of 
what might follow from an alliance with the Souriquois. The next day the 
Armouchiquois sagamore responded in kind, bringing the northerners a canoeload 
of what his people had. The Armouchiquois, however, did not have ready access to 
European manufacturers, and summer was not the hunting and trapping season; so 
all they offered was corn, beans and pumpkins. Messamouet took this as a 
rejection and, in Champlain's words, "departed much displeased...and with the 
intention of making war upon them before long", is 
It was not Messamouet, however, who returned to make war upon the 
Armouchiquois. After the meeting at Saco, Messamouet all but vanished from the 
historical record. Lescarbot mentioned him briefly in 1607, but there is nothing 
after that, and it is clear from both Lescarbot and Champlain that by 1607 
Membertou had replaced Messamouet as the preeminent Souriquois in the eyes of 
the French. 19 This in itself would probably have been enough to insure that he and 
Bashabes would eventually go to war, but more immediate clashes led to a rapid 
escalation of the situation. While negotiations had been taking place on the Saco, 
another party of Souriquois had stopped along the Penobscot River and killed 
16 John Smith seems to confirm that this was the Souriquois strategy; he wrote in 1616 that the 
Armouchiquois "sometimes have warres with the Bashabes of Pennobskot". Smith, A Description 
of New England, in Philip L. Barbour, ed., The Complete Works of Captain John Smith (1580-
1631), 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1986), 1: pp. 291-370 (quote on p. 341). 
17 Champlain, Voyages , 1: pp. 392-5; Alvin H. Morrison and Thomas H. Goetz, "Membertou's Raid 
on the Chouacoet 'Almouchiquois' — The Micmac Sack of Saco in 1607; English Translation of 
Marc Lescarbot", in William Cowan, ed., Papers of the Sixth Algonquian Conference (Ottawa, 
1975), pp. 141-79. 
18 Lescarbot, History, 2: pp. 323-4; Champlain, Voyages, 1: pp. 395-6; Morrison and Goetz, 
"Membertou's Raid". 
19 Morrison and Goetz, "Memberto's Raid", p. 172; Eileen C. Cushing, "Messamouet", Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, I (Toronto, 1966), p. 507. 
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several Etchemin. The latter, seeking revenge, had then killed a member of 
Membertou's band who happened to arrive soon after on a trading voyage and had 
had nothing to do with the earlier attack. When Bashabes learned of this, he tried 
to appease Membertou by denying any knowledge of the murder until after the fact, 
expressing his regret that it had happened and sending the body to Port Royal for 
proper burial. Membertou was not satisified. He called on the Souriquois and their 
allies "to take up vengeance for the wickedness and treachery commited by the 
subjects of Bassabes, and to make war on them as soon as possible".2o 
In the ensuing effort to enlist allies, Membertou flaunted his own growing 
connection with the French, just as Messamouet had done the year before. He 
assured fellow sagamores "we have close to us the support of the French I To 
whom these dogs have done a similar wrong", and he treated them to the fruits of 
that support — corn, beans and wine. As he told Poutrincourt, "'I am held your 
friend and that of all of Normans [i.e. French]...and to be held of you in esteem; it 
would be a reproach to me did I not show the effects ofthat love"'.2i 
By June 1607, a Souriquois war party, some of its members carrying guns 
obtained from the French, had assembled at Port Royal to revenge both the 
insulting conduct of the Armouchiquois and the murderous attack of Bashabes' 
Etchemin. On their way to the Saco, Membertou's warriors picked up their St. John 
Etchemin allies as well as some belonging to an Etchemin band from the 
Androscoggin River. The Androscoggin was near the southern limit of Bashabes' 
influence, and the sagamore there, Sasinou, may have been transferring his 
allegiance from Bashabes to Membertou in recognition of the latter's rising power 
and links to the French. Together, Membertou and his allies descended on Saco in 
July and won a decisive victory — killing 20 of the Armouchiquois, including their 
sagamore. 22 
Having defeated the Armouchiquois, however, Membertou did not go after 
Bashabes, despite his earlier calls for a war of revenge against the Etchemin. 
Without Indian testimony it is difficult to explain this decision, but it may be that 
Membertou was reacting to a change in the regional balance of power. His own 
French allies were leaving America; the Port Royal colonists had been recalled and 
were packing to go when Membertou left for the Saco.23 Moreover, a new player 
was entering the game, apparently on the side of Bashabes. While the Souriquois 
were fighting the Armouchiquois, English colonists had arrived among the 
Etchemin. 
The English, like the French, had been fishing off the coast of North America 
since early in the 16th century and by the close of the century had begun to consider 
20 Champlain, Voyages, 1: pp. 435-6, 442-5. 
21 Morrison and Goetz, "Membertou's Raid"; Lescarbot, History, 2: pp. 354-60. 
22 Champlain, Voyages, 1: pp. 451 and 457-8; Lescarbot, History, I: pp. 354-60 and 364; Morrison 
and Goetz, "Membertou's Raid"; Snow, Archaeology, pp. 26 and 37; Trigger, Natives and 
Newcomers, pp. 137-8; Alfred G. Bailey, The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian 
Cultures, 1504-1700 ([1937] Toronto, 1969), p. 13; Bourque and Whitehead, "Tarrentines", pp. 
333-4. 
23 Champlain, Voyages, I: pp. 450-69. 
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establishing permanent bases there. In an effort to prepare the way for such a base, 
the English navigator George Waymouth spent several weeks along the Acadian 
coast during the summer of 1605. He came to evaluate the region's potential and to 
capture some of its residents, and after two weeks in the Penobscot area he had 
accomplished both of his missions.24 He returned to England with news of a land 
"whose pleasant fertility bewraieth [sic] it selfe to be the garden of nature" and with 
five members of the Etchemin's Penobscot band.25 In England at least three of the 
kidnapped Indians were taken to live with Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who used his 
guests both as a source of information about America and as an advertising 
gimmick for the Virginia Company, which he was then helping to organize. "The 
longer I conversed with them the better hope they gave me of those parts where they 
did inhabit, as proper for our uses", wrote Gorges. The Spanish ambassador, 
however, reported that the English were also "teaching and training them to say 
how good that country is for people to go there and inhabit it".26 
Gorges and others questioned the Etchemin for a year, using what they learned 
to plan further American expeditions.27 Then they started to send the Indians back 
as guides and translators for English explorers and settlers. Two were included in 
the Virginia Company's first effort to settle New England, in August of 1606, but 
their ship was intercepted by a Spanish vessel and those aboard it thrown into a 
Spanish jail. Another, Nahanada, went that October with Thomas Hanham and 
Martin Pring to explore further the coast of Maine and stayed in Maine when 
Hanham and Pring returned to England, while a fourth, Skidwares, came back to 
America in 1607 as part of the Sagadahoc colony — the first English settlement in 
what later became New England. 28 It was the latter two, Nahanada and Skidwares, 
who brought the English into Membertou's war with Bashabes. 
Sagadahoc lay at the mouth of the Kennebec River, just north of the Saco, and 
was settled less than a month after Membertou's attack on the Armouchiquois. 
When the English arrived, Bashabes was in the midst of responding to that attack, 
24 James Rosier, A True Relation of the most prosperous voyage made this present yeere 1605, by 
Captaine George Waymouth, in the Discovery of the land of Virginia (London, 1605), (reissued as 
Prosperous Voyage in March of America Facsimile Series, number 17 (Ann Arbor, 1966)). Rosier 
states in his account that the return of live captives was "a matter of great importance to the full 
accomplement of our voyage" (p. 22) and that such captives would provide a source of "further 
instruction concerning all the promised particulars" of the new land (p. 31). 
25 Rosier, True Relation, p. 31. 
26 Ferdinando Gorges, "A Briefe Narration of the Originall Undertakings of the Advancment of 
Plantations Into the Parts of America", (London, 1658), in James P. Baxter, ed., Sir Ferdinando 
Gorges and His Province of Maine, 3 vols. (Boston, 1890), 2: pp. 1-81; A.L. Rowse, The 
Elizabethans and America (New York, 1959), pp. 90-7; Zuniga to the King of Spain, 16 March 
1606 in Alexander Brown, The Genesis of the United States, 2 vols. (Boston, 1890), 1: pp. 45-6. 
27 It seems likely, though impossible to prove, that what Philip Barbour called "The Manuscript 
'Instruction for a Voyage to New England'" was prepared on the basis of information provided by 
Gorges' Etchemin houseguests. Philip L. Barbour, "The Manuscript 'Instructions for a Voyage to 
New England' (1608-1610?)", in William Cowan, ed., Papers of the Eleventh Algonquian 
Conference (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 135-42. 
28 Snow, Archaeology, pp. 53-5. 
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and both Skidwares, who came with the English, and Nahanada, with whom they 
soon re-established contact, went to the aid of the Etchemin sagamore. In the wake 
of the Saco raid they helped punish the Androscoggin Etchemin who had joined the 
Souriquois. Of much greater importance, however, is the role they played in laying 
the groundwork for an Anglo-Etchemin alliance. Through early October at least, 
when the extant record breaks off abruptly, the former captives brought other 
Etchemin, including the brother of Bashabes, to meet the English and spoke 
frequently of their meeting Bashabes himself. Such a relationship was just what 
Bashabes needed to counter Membertou's Port Royal connection. The English were 
close but not too close to his home on the Penobscot, provided occasional gifts, 
such as knives, and promised to bring in the future "divers sorts of Merchandise for 
to trade with the Bashabe".29 
This unexpected development may explain why Membertou, despite his earlier 
threats, did not go on to attack Bashabes after his victory at the Saco. His own 
French allies were leaving Port Royal, and he had no way of knowing how deeply 
the English planned to involve themselves in Native affairs. The complication 
posed by the English proved brief though. During the winter of 1607-08 the settlers 
at Sagadahoc quarrelled with one another and with their Etchemin neighbours, their 
leader died, and many of their supplies were lost when their storehouse caught fire. 
When spring came, and an English ship with it, the survivors packed up and 
headed for home.30 
Membertou, on the other hand, could still exploit his links to the French, even 
after the evacuation of Port Royal. In the two years the French had been there they 
had provided the Souriquois with a stockpile of European products, including 
firearms, that Membertou could use to impress and intimidate his neighbours. 
Moreover, French ships continued to visit Port Royal and St. Croix and to 
demonstrate the Kingdom's continuing attachment to Membertou. This was shown 
most clearly, perhaps, in the summer of 1608, when a ship under Pierre Angibault 
(also known as Champdoré) returned to trade at Port Royal. After visiting 
Membertou, the French went on to the Saco, where they promised the 
Armouchiquois protection and convinced them to accept a truce with the 
Souriquois.3i To the French this made good business sense, as war might disrupt 
trade. To the region's Native community, it must have seemed further evidence of 
Membertou's ascendancy and of French support for his bid to control Acadia. 
Still more evidence appeared in 1610, when the French reoccupied Port Royal 
and brought with them the first French missionary to Canada. He was a secular 
priest named Jéssé Fléché, and he wasted no time. Fléché baptized any Native who 
would stand still long enough for the sacrament, including Membertou and 20 
29 Andrews, Colonial Period, 1: pp. 90-1; Snow, Archaeology, pp. 53-5; Henry O. Thayer, ed., The 
Sagadahoc Colony: Comprising the Relation of a Voyage into New England (Portland, Me., 1892); 
Alfred A. Cave, "Why Was the Sagahadoc Colony Abandoned? An Evaluation of the Evidence", 
The New England Quarterly, 68 (1995), pp. 625-40. 
30 Thayer, Sagadahoc, pp. 83-6; Cave, "Sagadahoc". 
31 Elizabeth Jones, Gentlemen and Jesuits: Quests for Glory and Adventure in the Early Days of New 
France (Toronto, 1986), pp. 124-5. 
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members of his family. To Christian observers, including the Jesuit priest, Pierre 
Biard, such wholesale "conversions" were of limited religious significance because 
initiates received no training before the ceremony and showed no understanding of 
it afterwards. "As regards Christ, the Church, the Faith and the Symbol, the 
commandments of GOD, prayer and the Sacraments, they knew almost nothing", 
wrote Biard. To the Souriquois however, such theological niceties were irrelevant. 
What mattered to them at this early stage in their relationship with the French was 
politics. "They accepted baptism as a sort of pledge of friendship and alliance with 
the French", wrote Father Biard. Moreover, that is also how it must have looked to 
other Natives in Acadia — that the French and the Souriquois had formalized an 
economic and military relationship that had evolved between them over the past six 
years. Thus, when Membertou announced after the ceremony that he would "have 
others baptized, or else make war on them", he was not calling for an American 
crusade. He was making a political statement, a promise to fight anyone who 
resisted Franco-Souriquois hegemony around the Gulf of Maine.32 
Membertou did not live long enough to carry out his threat, but by the time he 
died — in 1611 — France's most effective missionaries, the Jesuits, had already 
arrived in Port Royal, and while under orders not to establish missions anywhere 
else, members of the order did visit Etchemin settlements on the Penobscot and 
Kennebec rivers late in 1611. There, according to Father Pierre Biard, they laid the 
foundation for closer relations with the followers of Bashabes. "Through our 
conversations, pictures, and crosses, our way of living, and other similar things, 
they have received the first faint ideas and germs of our holy faith, which will some 
day take root and grow abundantly, please God, if it is followed by a longer and 
better cultivation"^ 
The opportunity to begin that "longer and better cultivation" was not long in 
coming. Word reached Port Royal in the spring of 1613 that the Jesuits were free to 
operate anywhere they wanted and that their patroness wanted them to establish a 
mission on the Penobscot. Her wish set in motion a fascinating contest between the 
French and the Etchemin. The French wanted to settle among the Etchemin and 
bring them "the happy freedom of the favored children of God", but the Etchemin 
must have seen the French as allies of the Souriquois and, therefore, as potential 
enemies.34 
Late in May, 1613, the Jesuits left Port Royal for the Penobscot, but this time 
they intended to go farther than they had in 1611. They planned to sail up the 
32 Robert Rumilly, L'Acadie Française (1497-17B) (Louisville, Quebec, 1981), pp. 15-32; Jones 
Gentlemen and Jesuits, pp. 123-37; "A Letter Missive in regard to the Conversion and Baptism of 
the Grand Sagamore of new France", 28 June 1610, in Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and 
Allied Docments, [JR] 1: pp. 121-3; Pierre Biard to Christopher Baltazar, 10 June 1611, JR 1: pp. 
139-83; Pierre Biard, "Canadian Mission: Letter from Port Royal in Acadia", 31 January 1611, JR, 
2: pp. 59-105 (quote on p. 89); Campeau, ed., Monumenta Novae Franciae, I: pp. ccxliv-ccxlv; 
Kenneth M. Morrison, "Baptism and Alliance: The Symbolic Meditations of Religious 
Syncretism", Ethnohistory, 37 (1990), pp. 416-37. 
33 Pierre Biard to the Reverend Father Provincial, 31 January 1612, JR, 2: pp. 4-55 (quote on p. 53). 
34 Ibid, (quote on p. 55). 
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Penobscot to the mouth of the Kenduskeag (Kedesquit) River and to establish 
themselves near Upsegon, Bashabes' principal village. As the Jesuits sailed south, 
however, they ran into thick fog along the Maine coast and for two days had no 
idea where they were. When the weather finally cleared the ship's pilot recognized 
Mount Desert Island, just east of Penobscot Bay, and quickly sailed into a harbour 
that the grateful French named Saint Sauveur. From there the Jesuits intended to 
sail on to the Penobscot and up that river to the Kenduskeag. The ship's crew, 
however, had other ideas. They had been engaged to bring the party to Acadia and 
had done so. Besides, added the captain, no one had ever sailed up the rock-strewn 
Penobscot as far as the missionaries had in mind, and he did not intend to be the 
first. 35 
In the midst of this dispute, the French noticed a plume of smoke and, perhaps 
thankful for the distraction, set off to investigate its source. It came from an 
Etchemin camp at the mouth of the Union River, just opposite Mount Desert, where 
the Natives already showed a keen understanding of Christianity and of the Jesuits. 
When they learned the French were bound for Kenduskeag, the Natives tried to 
convince them to stay on the Union River instead. '"If thou wishest to stay in these 
regions'", they asked, "'why dost thou not rather remain here with us, who have 
truly as good and beautiful a place as Kadesquit?'" When this approach failed they 
tried another, telling the Jesuits '"it is necessary that thou comest, since Asticou, 
our sagamore, is sick unto death; and if thou dost not come he will die without 
baptism, and will not go to heaven'". This found the missionaries' weak spot, and 
they quickly agreed to go see Asticou, whose illness proved far less threatening 
than reported. "We found him truly sick", wrote Father Biard, "but not unto death, 
for it was only a cold that troubled him". Biard also wrote, however, that his 
journey convinced him Asticou's band had not exaggerated the appeal of its Union 
River home. The French, therefore, decided to stay at Saint Sauveur and build their 
mission there.36 
Why the Union River Etchemin were so anxious to keep the French from 
proceeding remains a mystery. Two explanations seem likely, but it is impossible 
to prove or disprove either one. The first assumes that Bashabes remained the 
dominant sagamore of the Kennebec and Penobscot valleys. If that were the case 
then the Union River sagamore, Asticou, could have been acting to protect 
Bashabes and the villages loyal to him. Keeping the French on the coast would 
leave them close enough to trade with but miles from the Indians' principal 
villages, thus providing Bashabes with a counter to the Souriquois' cosy 
relationship with Port Royal without bringing foreigners dangerously close. The 
second interpretation depends on Bashabes' influence beginning to fray at the 
edges. One sagamore had already sided with Membertou during the latter's 1607 
raid on Saco, and if Asticou's loyalty was wavering too, then his inviting the 
French to stay at Saint Sauveur looks suspiciously like an effort to establish his 
own link to the French or to the emerging Franco-Souriquois alliance. Either 
35 Pierre Biard, "A Relation of New France", 1616, JR, 3: pp. 261-5. 
36 Ibid., 3: pp. 261-73. 
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explanation fits the events of the decade preceding 1613, and the fact that Asticou 
replaced Bashabes as chief sagamore at the latter's death could mean either that he 
was loyal to the end or that his scheming paid off. 37 In either case, Etchemin 
wishes figured prominently in the Jesuits' decision to build their mission at Saint 
Sauveur rather than Upsegon. 
What has been less well understood, even by students of Native American 
history, is the extent to which Indian actions may also have contributed to the 
mission's destruction. An Indian role has long been clear. According to the French, 
a Kennebec Etchemin told them afterwards that he mistook the English ship 
Treasurer for a French vessel and naively directed it to Saint Sauveur. 38 No one 
seems to have considered that the Indian might have known all along that Argali 
was English — an enemy of the French — and may have deliberately sent him to 
Saint Sauveur in the hope that he would destroy the mission and remove a Franco-
Souriquois threat to Bashabes. 
It is certainly not unreasonable to think that a Penobscot or Kennebec Etchemin 
could distinguish between English and French sailors in 1613. Many Acadian 
Natives could distinguish among the different nationalities visiting their region and 
had been doing so for years. Marc Lescarbot claimed that Souriquois around Port 
Royal in 1607 had been able to distinguish between Basques and other Frenchmen, 
and Pierre Biard wrote in 1611 that the St. John Etchemin identified Basques and 
residents of St. Malo as different from other Frenchmen. Further south, when 
Samuel Champlain sailed past Penobscot Bay in 1605 he encountered an Indian 
sagamore of the region who told him that a fishing vessel — actually George 
Waymouth's ship — had killed five Indians — the captives Waymouth took back 
to England — and, wrote Champlain, "from his description of the men on the ship 
we judged they were English". Champlain did not explain what the Indian saw or 
heard that distinguished an Englishman from a Frenchman. It could have been any 
number of things: dress, language, decorum, ship design, flags, religion and who 
knows what else. Whatever it was, though, the Indians were quick to notice it. And 
two years later, in 1607, English settlers from Sagadahoc sailed up the Kennebec 
and reported "sartain Salvages Callinge unto us in broken inglyshe". Clearly, by 
1613 there were Etchemin who knew the difference between the English and the 
French.39 
Nor is it unreasonable to think that a Native of the Kennebec-Penobscot region 
would understand the rivalry that existed between England and France. Nahanada, 
Skidwares and the other Waymouth captives must have learned about it during 
37 Snow, "Eastern Abenaki", p. 141. 
38 Biard, "Relation", JR , 3: pp. 275-9; McManis, European Impressions of the New England Coast, 
1497-1629, p. 87; Alvin H. Morrison, "Dawnland Decisions: Seventeenth-Century Wabanaki 
Leaders and Their Responses to the Differential Contact Stimuli in the Overlap Area of New France 
and New England", Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York-Buffalo, 1974, pp. 80-1. 
39 Lescarbot, History, 2: pp. 348-9; Biard to Baltazar, 10 June 1611, JR, 1: p. 163; Champlain, 
Voyages, 1: pp. 364-5; Thayer, Sagadahoc, p. 75. Concerning a similar phenomenon in the Pacific 
Northwest, see Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819 
(New Haven and London, 1973), pp. 164-5 and 179-80. 
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their stay in England, and English settlers at Sagadahoc, no doubt, expressed their 
animosity towards the French and probably tried to win Etchemin support. 
Certainly the English, for their part, considered the Etchemin potential allies 
against the French and the Souriquois. When John Smith planned a small colony 
for New England, in 1615, he wrote that "the maine assistance next God, I had to 
this small number [of settlers], was my acquaintance among the Salvages; 
especially, with Dohannida [i.e. Nahanada]...who had lived long in England". 
"With him and diverse others", continued Smith, "I had concluded to inhabit, and 
defend them against the Terentynes [Souriquois]; with a better power than the 
French did them; whose tyranny did inforce them to imbrace my offer, with no 
small devotion".4o 
This is not to say that the Etchemin would have considered the English their 
friends and welcomed their return with open arms. The English had, after all, 
kidnapped several Etchemin in 1605 and had sometimes failed to meet or even 
understand Native standards of hospitality during their stay at Sagadahoc.41 
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that the Etchemin recognized Argali as the 
enemy of their enemies and hoped to exploit his presence to help them expel a more 
immediate threat from the French. All they had to do was point Argall in the 
direction of Saint Sauveur. If the attack succeeded, it would expel the French from 
Bashabes' territory. If it failed they could tell the French it had all been a dreadful 
mistake. 
It did not fail. Saint Sauveur fell to the English, and its founders were sent back 
to France or carried to Virginia as prisoners. Moreover, when the Treasurer arrived 
in Jamestown, it was ordered back to Acadia to finish what it had started.Thus, in 
October, 1613, the English returned to Saint Sauveur and razed what they had 
missed the first time. Then, they attacked Saint Croix and Port Royal, destroying 
both and driving most of the French out of Acadia completely.42 But if Bashabes 
helped engineer the French defeat, it was a pyrrhic victory. Expulsion of the French 
did not end the struggle between Etchemin and Souriquois for regional surpremacy. 
Indeed, Alvin Morrison has suggested that the virtual elimination of French 
settlement in the region removed a powerful check on Souriquois ambitions and 
that the tribe's renewed assault on the Etchemin was an unforeseen consequence of 
Argali's raids. Over the next several years, the Souriquois escalated their attacks, 
and about 1615, in the words of Ferdinando Gorges, they "surprised the Bashaba, 
and slew him and all his People near about him".43 
Given the extant evidence, it is impossible to prove that Bashabes used the 
English for his own ends. But that is not the point. It is not the aim of this paper 
40 A Description of New England, in Barbour, ed., The Complete Works of Captain John Smith, 1: p. 
351. 
41 Cave, "Sagadahoc", pp. 638-40. 
42 Biard, "Relation", JR, 3: pp. 275-83 and 4: pp. 9-37; Clark, Acadia, p. 81; Rumilly, L'Acadie, pp. 
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to prove that the interpretation offered here of the events at Saint Sauveur is more 
valid than the traditional view. Rather, I want to offer Saint Sauveur as an 
example of the fact that when considering the early stages of contact between 
Natives and colonizers the range of plausible alternatives is often wider than 
Eurocentric scholars are willing to admit. In that regard we are still too much like 
Marc Lescarbot. When Lescarbot met Membertou, he wrote that the sagamore acted 
like he was "the equal of the King". Lescarbot advised the French King to humour 
Membertou, but he never believed that the sagamore was really the equal of Henry 
IV because racial and cultural blinders prevented him from recognizing the reality 
of power in early Acadia. Among modern scholars, hindsight often has the same 
effect. Knowing as we do that European germs and European technology eventually 
devastated Native cultures, we sometimes forget how long that process took, and 
we act as if the final outcome was known in advance to Indians and Europeans 
meeting for the first time. Worse, we forget that Native Americans had their own 
agendas in which Europeans were not always central. 
In their world, Membertou, Bashabes and Messamouet were the equals of the 
king. Before disease decimated Acadia's Native population, sometime after 1615, 
sagamores had the power to negotiate or to compete with Europeans as their equals 
and to use them just as selfishly as the Europeans tried to use the Natives. Both 
sides were in a position to employ a range of tactics to advance their ends. In the 
complex politics of early Acadia, each party could offer favours to the others, could 
withhold them, could withdraw, could attack and could form or break alliances. 
And in order to understand the choices that Native leaders made, historians have to 
remember the world in which they made them. 
